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The Third International Conference on Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets is one in a series of academic events organized by the Emerging 
Markets Corporate Governance Network (EMCGN). The Global Corporate 
Governance Forum at IFC endorses and supports the Network, which was 
first convened by Professor Stijn Claessens in 2001. The biannual 
academic conferences organized by the Network feature themes that are 
important to academics and practitioners interested in the role and effect 
of corporate governance in emerging markets.
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The Third International Conference on Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets included 
38 papers authored by scholars from 18 countries. The papers, organized into 10 thematically 
different sessions, explore important topical areas in corporate governance research. They 
document how institutions can affect firm valuation, influence the extent of corporate 
governance problems, and affect firm performance and financial structure. Some papers 
report on how voluntary corporate governance mechanisms—ownership structures, boards, 
cross-listing, use of independent directors—affect firm performance and behavior. Other 
papers look at factors that influence countries’ willingness to undertake corporate 
governance reforms. In keeping with the Network’s tradition, the conference included two 
keynote lectures—on the political economy of governance, and on research issues in the 
corporate governance field—presented by members of the Network’s scientific committee. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE FIRST DAY 
The conference began with welcoming speeches from Professor Jinkyu Lee (the Dean of Korean 
University Business School) and Professor Hasung Jang (Chairman of the Organizing Committee) 
emphasizing the importance of corporate governance reforms In Korea’s economic development and 
the role of research in supporting the reforms, followed by  Professor Stijn Claessens’s (IMF and 
University of Amsterdam) opening remarks. Stijn Claessens presented the evolution of the Emerging 
Markets Corporate Governance Research Network. He reminded attendees that the Network’s primary 
purpose is to stimulate research on corporate governance in emerging markets as well as in transition 
and developing countries, with the objective of raising the academic quality of research, fostering 
international exchange among scholars in all regions, and enhancing the dialogue of researchers with 
policy makers and the private sector. Areas that require continuing attention from researchers, 
Claessens noted, are ownership structures and their relationship to performance, internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and stakeholders’ roles, and public and private enforcement. He also 
emphasized the increased importance of the governance of financial institutions in both developed and 
developing markets, and he suggested that lessons from corporate governance research can be applied 
to regulatory corporate governance.      
The first day continued with two parallel sessions, on Institutions and Corporate Governance. 
Seven papers were presented in these sessions.  
 3 
 
First Keynote Address: Randall Morck  
Randall Morck’s entertaining and thought-provoking keynote address provided an analysis of 
the relationship between economic development and religious and legal institutions, based on 
a review of the history of “corporatism.” As a body of “normative economics,” the professor 
explained, corporatism puts the police power of the state behind officially sanctioned 
corporations—elite-controlled industrial group cartels empowered to set wages, prices, 
employment, and quotas—thereby guaranteeing workers their customary jobs and incomes. 
Morck argued that countries that adopted corporatism most fully—those with Roman Catholic 
majorities or French-educated elites—experienced substantial financial development reversals. 
He further suggested that the legacy of corporatism promoted by the Roman Catholic Church in 
the late nineteenth century continues to retard financial development and growth even today.  
 
Drawing parallels between socialism and corporatism, which presumed the continual reliability 
of a benevolent and competent elite, Morck noted that good intentions were no protection 
against abuse of authority. In the search for a perfect economic system, he explained, the 
genuine middle way would be the liberal democratic welfare state, which protects private 
property, enforces contracts, and perhaps even regulates financial institutions while letting 
markets signal prices and thus the incentives that, by coordinating economic activity efficiently, 
justify the existence of private property in a liberal free-market economy. Supervision of the 
economy is the job of the government; it must design and operate a system that mediates the 
control and redistribution of resources. Control over an economy’s resources translates 
unfailingly into power over others; so, governments must acknowledge that they are charged 
with distributing, legitimizing, and limiting the power of some people over other people. Given 
the common acknowledgement of an increasing role for governments in the oversight of 
markets, Morck’s remarks were timely. 
 
Afternoon Sessions 
Two parallel afternoon sessions—Family-Controlled Firms and Shareholders Rights and 
Corporate Control—addressed shareholders rights and implications of concentrated ownership 
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for minority shareholders. The Conference continued with a special session on Green Financing 
and Corporate Social Responsibility, in addition to the traditional topical areas of previous 
conferences. Seven papers were presented in these sessions. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE SECOND DAY 
The second day started with three parallel sessions: CEO and the Board of Directors, Capital 
Markets and Corporate Governance, and Governance of Business Groups, with three papers 
for each session.   
Three more parallel sessions followed: Market for Corporate Control, Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and Corporate Decisions, and Agency Problem and Managerial Incentives. Three 
papers were presented in each session.   
Second Keynote Address: Bernard Black 
The conference closed with Bernard Black’s keynote speech on the challenges faced by 
researchers in investigating the relationship between governance indicators and firm 
performance. Based on his “Causal Inference Strategies in Corporate Governance Research,” 
written jointly with Vladimir Atanasov and Inessa Love, the professor presented strategies that 
researchers can use in exploring and explaining whether corporate governance is associated 
with—and causes—a change in market value, accounting performance, or firm behavior.  
Starting with the sources of the endogeneity problem (such as reverse causality, unobserved 
firm heterogeneity, and omitted variables) as the main obstacles to inferring causality, Black 
cited examples from his own research. He presented four requirements for a causal inference: 
that the causal effect is exogenous, that it causes governance change, that performance is 
predicted only through change in governance, and that a control group exists. He suggested six 
research strategies, applicable to different situations, that researchers can use, provided that 
the four conditions are met. Black’s country studies on the causal relationship between 
governance and performance are good examples of how these strategies are used. 
 5 
Closing 
In his closing remarks, Phil Armstrong, Head of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, 
emphasized the importance of scientific research in supporting corporate governance reforms. 
Melsa Ararat, coordinator of the Network, asked for nominations for host of the Fourth 
International Corporate Governance Conference, which is planned for 2013, and she thanked 
Korean University and AICG for their hospitality and flawless organization of the conference.   
 
SYNTHESIS OF THE FINDINGS 
Perhaps the best way to understand the importance of specific governance issues discussed 
during the conference—and their relevance for economic development in emerging markets—
is from the perspective of ownership structures and the related organizational form of business 
groups. Elements worth highlighting are the wide variety in ownership concentration across 
countries and the variation in business group structures. This diversity leads to a large variation 
in the nature of principal-agent problems and subsequently in corporate governance issues. 
What follows is a summary of the conference and highlights of research from this perspective. 
(See the end of this report for a list of papers presented at each session.) 
 
Ownership Structures and Shareholder Rights 
Although specific corporate governance problems vary from country to country, ownership 
structure is an important factor common to all countries, because it defines the nature of 
principal-agent issues. For instance, it is necessary to distinguish between direct ownership 
(also called cash-flow rights) and control rights (who has de facto control over the running of 
the corporation, also called voting rights). Even though family ownership is prevalent in many 
emerging market corporations, other owners are also important, either as dominant 
shareholders or as a device for monitoring the controlling families. Another key factor is group 
affiliation, especially in emerging markets, where business groups can dominate economic 
activity. 
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Two full sessions were devoted to this topic, and other sessions also included papers that 
addressed different aspects of ownership structures. In the session on Family-Controlled Firms, 
John Nowland, En-Te Chen, and Stephen Gray presented a paper analyzing four mechanisms of 
family involvement in listed firms in Taiwan: through ownership, board representation, family 
chief executive officers, and family managers. For family directors and family managers, they 
found a negative relationship to firm performance, but they found no relationships to firm 
performance for family ownership and family chief executive officers.   
Kee-Hong Bae, Seung-Bo Kim, and Woochan Kim reported a similar finding in the context of a 
special type of not-for-profit organization, Korean private universities. They found that 
measures of family commitment (proxy for good governance) are positively related to the 
university performance, and measures of family control (proxy for bad governance) are 
negatively related. They also found that poorly governed universities are more likely to undergo 
a dispute between the controlling family and other stakeholders.   
An analysis of Russian firms, by Andrei Kuznetsov, Rostislav Kapelyushnikov, and Natalya 
Dyomina, also yielded findings in line with these two papers. Their paper cites evidence of a 
negative relationship between the size of the dominant owners’ shareholding and performance 
variables of the firms. The findings also show that shared control (multiple large shareholders) 
increases efficiency.   
The relationship between ownership structures and performance can change not only over 
time but also across different institutional settings, including cultural norms. In the session on 
Institutions and Corporate Governance, Raphael Amit, Yuan Ding, Belen Villalonga, and Hua 
Zhang presented their analysis of the impact of institutional development across the Chinese 
provinces, showing differences in cultural norms, law, and regulation. They found that, when 
institutional efficiency is low, family ownership and management increase value, but family 
control in excess of ownership reduces value. When institutional efficiency is high, however, 
none of these factors is significant.   
In the same session, a paper by Rima Turk Ariss analyzed the extent to which differences in 
legal tradition, judicial efficiency, and investor protection affect debt financing and risk taking 
across developing economies. She reported that, when legal formalism is high, firms contract 
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more debt but are less willing to undertake risky investments.  
In the session on the Governance of Business Groups, two papers focused on the 
diversification of business groups in emerging markets. Raheel Gohar and Semra Karacaer 
showed the impact of diversification on firm value, comparing group-affiliated Pakistani firms 
with nonaffiliated ones. And Ayse Karaevli looked at four Turkish business groups and reported 
that the degree of unrelated diversification depends on several firm-specific factors (scale and 
scope, bank ties, and the strength of the distribution network) that stem from the 
characteristics of the founder (merchant versus industrialist background, risk-taking propensity) 
and the entrepreneurs’ strategic choices at the time of founding and in early years of the 
group’s development. A third paper, by Kaustav Sen, Jayati Sarkar, and Subrata Sarkar, looked 
at Indian groups and reported that the degree of opportunistic earnings management tends to 
increase with insider control. 
Another aspect of ownership structure is the role of institutional investors, which to date is 
much less significant in most emerging markets than in developed countries. Two papers 
addressed the role of institutional investors in emerging markets. In the session on Shareholder 
Rights and Corporate Control, Assaf Hamdani and Yishay Yafeh reported that institutional 
investors, as minority shareholders, can play only a limited direct role in corporate governance 
in emerging markets. Moreover, the presence of powerful families who control many public 
companies through business groups creates new potential sources of conflicts of interest for 
institutional investors. For the session on Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corporate 
Decision, Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner, and Laura T. Starks shared their findings 
that large differences in preferences for activism exist between institutional investors in the 
United States and the Netherlands, countries which differ considerably in their ownership 
structures. These two papers indicate that studies on the role of institutional investors in 
emerging markets are largely nonexistent to date.  
Another paper, by Meijun Qian, Hongbo Pan, and Bernard Yeung for the session on Agency 
Problem and Managerial Incentive, focused on the role of political connections under 
concentrated ownership in China. The authors showed that expropriation by controlling 
shareholders through tunneling or self-dealing is far more severe in firms that are politically 
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connected than in those that are not politically connected. The paper notes that this severity 
results more from the politically connected firms’ lesser concern with capital market 
punishment than from the possibility that such firms tend to establish political connections for 
protection.  
 
Corporate Governance Reforms  
Some papers presented at the conference provided examples of important corporate 
governance reforms and their effects, and another set of papers examined the various 
voluntary mechanisms of governance that firms have adopted. 
Korea has been frequently studied because of its dramatic reforms in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. These reforms triggered restructuring activities by Korean firms. One such 
reform was the removal of statute-based antitakeover provisions (ATPs) during the aftermath 
of the Asian financial crisis, prompting a significant number of Korean firms to introduce 
charter-based measures. Woochan Kim and Sunwoo Hwang presented a paper on this issue for 
the session on Market for Control. They found that firms with charter-based antitakeover 
provisions are smaller in size, have lower inside and foreign ownerships, and, upon adoption of 
ATPs, experience lower share prices, which drop with inside ownership. They also showed that 
ATP adoptions are followed by lower profitability and lower dividend payouts, and that firms 
with ATPs also experienced greater delistings during the global financial crisis. In the same 
session, the paper by Hee Sub Byun, Woojin Kim, Eun Jung Lee, and Kyung Suh Park 
complemented these findings by showing that the market for corporate control in Korea does 
not function as a disciplining mechanism but rather as a potential tunneling channel that 
raiders take advantage of. The third paper in this session, by Natasha Burns and Ivonne 
Liebenberg, was also related to the market for corporate control and showed the differential 
effects of U.S. takeovers in emerging and developed markets. 
Another set of reforms aims to strengthen the board structures by introducing a mandatory 
quota for outsiders or independent outsiders. Three papers presented in the session on CEO 
and the Board of Directors analyzed the impact of board reforms and related issues. The first 
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paper, by Sung Wook Joh and Jin Young Jung, showed that independent outside directors in 
Korea improve firm value, on average, but friendly outside directors have negative impact. 
Independent boards perform better in large firms and in firms with less information asymmetry 
and high transparency. However, friendly boards increase firm value more than independent 
boards, when their firms face financial volatility and threats of mergers and acquisitions. The 
paper by Qianru Qi and Lu Xu examined methods of strategic network formation to estimate 
the impact of board interlock networks on directorship, market outcomes, and firm values. This 
study highlighted the dominant role of ties to other board members in the appointment of 
directors. It also reported that interlock connections decreased firms’ values pre-SOX 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and increased them post-SOX. On the other hand, boards appear 
ineffective—or even hurt minority shareholders—in countries where some arbitrarily low level 
of board independence is recommended by existing codes of governance. The third paper, by 
Melsa Ararat, Hakan Orbay, and Burcin Yurtoglu, showed that board independence is 
ineffective in Turkey, where the level of board independence is quite low (about 7 percent of all 
directors are independent). All three papers used appropriate techniques to deal with 
endogeneity problems—that better firms are more likely to adopt more independent boards.   
Findings presented by Hee Sub Byun, Ji Hye Lee, and Kyung Suh Park in the session on 
Institutions and Corporate Governance showed that the effectiveness of the board of directors 
(as well as other internal governance mechanisms) improves with a higher degree of product 
market competition. Their findings suggested that corporate governance and market 
competitiveness are complementary. 
In the session on Agency Problem and Managerial Incentive, Yang Qing and Burcin Yurtoglu 
documented a similar positive impact from improvements in the regulatory regime in China. 
During 2005–2006, Chinese regulators used a decentralized process to eliminate nontradable 
shares (NTS)—long recognized by investors as one of the major hurdles to corporate 
governance—in the capital of listed firms. According to the authors, one channel through which 
the NTS reform fortified corporate governance in Chinese firms is by strengthening the direct 
link between incentive-based compensation and firm performance in China.   
Another reform in China was the January 2002 introduction of mandatory cumulative voting in 
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director elections. In the session on Shareholder Rights and Corporate Control, Jun “QJ” Qian 
and Shan Zhao presented a paper showing that, relative to other firms, firms with cumulative 
voting experienced less expropriation and improved investment efficiency and performance. In 
the same session, Zhihong Chen, Bin Ke, and Zhifeng Yang shared their analysis of the impact 
of a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity-offering proposals to seek the 
separate approval of minority shareholders. They reported that the effectiveness of this reform 
depends on the composition of minority shareholders. 
 
Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Governance Practices  
Empirical evidence shows that firms adapt to weaker environments by adopting voluntary 
corporate governance measures, that these mechanisms can add value, and that they are 
appreciated by investors in a variety of countries. At the same time, a country’s legal and 
enforcement environment can still reduce their effectiveness. The following papers analyze 
these mechanisms. 
In the last decade, many researchers have linked firms’ actual corporate governance practices 
to their market valuation and performance. In the session on Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and Corporate Decision, Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho, and 
Érica Gorga presented a paper illustrating that the magnitude of the effects of corporate 
governance can be quite substantial. By comparing effects in Brazil, India, Korea, and Russia, 
they found that different practices are important in different countries for different types of 
companies. Country characteristics thus influence which aspects of corporate governance affect 
market value for which firms. These results support a flexible approach to governance, with 
ample room for firm choice, rather than a top-down regulatory approach.  
In the same session, Vitaliy Zheka reported similar results, showing that Ukrainian firms that 
practice better corporate governance benefited the most from the improved liquidity in 2000–
2007, because they adjusted their financial structures at higher rates.   
In the session, Agency Problem and Managerial Incentive, David Oesch, Manuel Ammann, and 
Markus M. Schmid used firm-level data from Governance Metrics International to show that 
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firms with poor firm-level governance hold significantly more cash than firms with better firm-
level governance. They also documented a positive effect of cash holdings on firm value for 
firms with good firm-level corporate governance.  
Another cross-country, firm-level study, presented by Mark Lang and Mark Maffett in the 
session on Institutions and Corporate Governance, showed that firms with greater 
transparency (based on accounting standards, auditor choice, earnings management, analyst 
following, and analyst forecast accuracy) experience less liquidity volatility, fewer extreme 
illiquidity events, and lower correlations between firm-level liquidity and both market liquidity 
and market returns. These results are particularly pronounced during crisis periods. 
Cross-listing securities on foreign markets is a specific way to access international financial 
markets and can relate to and affect firms’ corporate governance practices. The “bonding” 
argument, for example, claims that by cross-listing in a stronger environment, firms commit to 
tough disclosure and corporate governance rules. In the session on Capital Markets and 
Corporate Governance, however, Jaiho Chung, Hyejin Cho, and Woojin Kim challenged the 
bonding argument by showing that firms are more likely to choose cross-listing destinations 
that are less strict on self-dealing or that exhibit higher block premiums than the origin country. 
Amir Licht, Xi Li, and Jordan Siegel reported similar findings from their analysis of markets’ 
reactions to a sudden radical change in the regulations for U.S.-listed foreign firms. These 
papers indicated that there is considerable debate on the corporate governance motivations for 
and benefits of cross-listing. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Green Financing 
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Firms’ 
greater emphasis on CSR activities can be interpreted as a shift in the interaction between 
firms, their institutional environment, and important stakeholders. But, it is less clear whether 
participation in social issues is also related to good firm performance. To address this issue, the 
conference introduced a special session on Green Financing and Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
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A paper by Kenneth Amaeshi, Onyeka K. Osuji, and Jonathan P. Doh argued that CSR 
complements existing public and informal governance configurations and thus creates a better 
chance that both the public and private governance modes will compensate for each other’s 
weaknesses in the governance of corporate externalities. In other words, CSR becomes a 
private initiative or voluntary effort by firms to fill some governance voids or to complement 
existing governance modes within specific institutional configurations, especially in developing 
economies with weak capitalist institutions.  
Another paper, by Muhammad Asif Paryani, offered a case study of Pakistan. It revealed 
various deficiencies of uniform lawmaking for the promotion of CSR activities with the 
involvement of all the stakeholders in the country. The role of stakeholders is required to be 
more focused, effective, and efficient toward good corporate governance and implementation 
of CSR.  
An empirical study by Liguo Lin, Jon J. Moon, and Haitao Yin found that, among Chinese firms, 
those with international links are more likely to exhibit better compliance with environmental 
regulation than are those with no international links. These results indicate that financing 
foreign investment into emerging economies could serve a “green” purpose, leading to better 
corporate environmental performance. In another case study, this time on Korea, Deokkyo Oh 
drew attention to the importance of public financial participation for the development of green 
financing. He argued that credit guarantees for green technologies in small and medium 
enterprises will be pivotal.  
Hyoung Goo Kang offered a theoretical analysis of the capital budgeting decisions for green 
projects. He argued that green projects are usually subject to high uncertainty or social 
controversy and that existing approaches are polarized: financial economists tend to apply the 
variations of traditional discounted cash flow models, but strategy and organization researchers 
emphasize social and environmental responsibilities over qualitative sociopolitical processes of 
valuation. His paper attempted to reconcile these two approaches by showing that their 
applicability depends on the degree of uncertainty or social controversy surrounding the 
project. The session demonstrated that substantial theoretical and empirical research is 
necessary for a full understanding of these important issues. 
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SESSIONS AND PAPERS BY TOPIC1
 
 
Agency Problem and Managerial Incentive 
• Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in Politically Connected Firms. Meijun Qian, 
Hongbo Pan, and Bernard Yeung. 
• The Impact of the Split-share Structure Reform on Compensation Incentive Based on Firm 
Performance in China. Yang Qing and Burcin Yurtoglu. 
• Cash Holdings and Corporate Governance around the World. David Oesch, Manuel 
Ammann, and Markus M. Schmid. 
Capital Markets and Corporate Governance 
• Is Cross-Listing a Commitment Mechanism? Evidence from Cross-Listings around the 
World. Jaiho Chung, Hyejin Cho, and Woojin Kim. 
• Private Placements, Regulatory Restrictions and Firm Value: Theory and Evidence from 
the Indian Market. Vijaya Marisetty. 
• How do Firms Issue Shares? Evidence from Around the World. David McLean, Tianyu 
Zhang, and Mengxin Zhao. 
CEO and the Board of Directors 
• Effects of Independent and Friendly Outside Directors. Sung Wook Joh and Jin Young 
Jung. 
• How Does The Director's Social Network Matter? Evidence from Structure Estimation. 
Qianru Qi and Lu Xu. 
• The Effects of Board Independence in Controlled Firms: Evidence from Turkey. Melsa 
Ararat, Hakan Orbay, and Burcin Yurtoglu. 
                                                          
1  Papers are available at http://www.gcgf.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/Content/Korea_RN_May2011. 
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Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Decision 
• Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors. 
Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner, and Laura T. Starks. 
• Does One Size Fit All in Corporate Governance? Evidence from Brazil (and other BRIK 
Countries). Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho, and Érica Gorga. 
• The Impact of Corporate Governance Practices on Dynamic Adjustment of Capital 
Structure of Companies in Ukraine. Vitaliy Zheka. 
Family-Controlled Firms 
• Family Involvement and Family Firm Performance. John Nowland, En-Te Chen, and 
Stephen Gray. 
• Family Control and Expropriation of Not-for-Profit Organizations: Evidence from Korean 
Private Universities. Kee-Hong Bae, Seung-Bo Kim, and Woochan Kim. 
• The Impact of Concentrated Ownership on Firm Performance in an Emerging Market: 
Evidence from Russia. Andrei Kuznetsov, Rostislav Kapelyushnikov, and Natalya 
Dyomina. 
Green Financing and Corporate Social Responsibility 
• Corporate Social Responsibility as a Market Governance Mechanism: Any Implications 
for Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies? Kenneth Amaeshi, Onyeka K. Osuji, 
and Jonathan P. Doh. 
• Corporate Social Responsibility, the Role of Stakeholders and Sustainable Development. 
Muhammad Asif Paryani. 
• Emerging of Financial-Industrial Groups due to Post-1989 Changes in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia. Danes Brzica. 
• Foreign Investment, Export, and Greener Production in Emerging Economies? Evidence 
from Shanghai. Liguo Lin, Jon J. Moon, and Haitao Yin. 
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• Green Financing in Korea. Deokkyo Oh. 
• Rights Issues and Creeping Acquisitions in India. Shamim S. Mondal and Gaurav Jetley. 
• Valuation of Green Projects with Social Considerations. Hyoung Goo Kang. 
Governance of Business Groups 
• Business Group's Diversification and Firm Value: a Comparison of Pakistani Business 
Group Affiliated and Unaffiliated Firms. Raheel Gohar and Semra Karacaer. 
• Insider Control, Group Affiliation and Earnings Management in Emerging Economies: 
Evidence from India. Kaustav Sen, Jayati Sarkar, and Subrata Sarkar. 
• Strategic Change or Deja Vu? Why do Business Groups Still Unrelatedly Diversify in 
Emerging Markets? Ayse Karaevli. 
Institutions and Corporate Governance 
• Enforceability and the Effectiveness of Laws and Regulations. Ke Li, Lei Lu, and Jun “QJ” 
Qian. 
• How Does Product Market Competition Interact with Internal Corporate Governance? 
Evidence from the Korean Economy. Hee Sub Byun, Ji Hye Lee, and Kyung Suh Park. 
• Institutions, Investor Protection, and Corporate Choices in Developing Economies. Rima 
Turk Ariss. 
• The Role of Institutional Development in the Prevalence and Value of Family Firms. 
Raphael Amit, Yuan Ding, Belen Villalonga, and Hua Zhang. 
• Transparency and Liquidity Uncertainty in Crisis Periods. Mark Lang and Mark Maffett. 
• What Makes the Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving the Supreme Court and 
Cross-Listed Firms. Amir N. Licht, Xi Li, and Jordan I. Siegel. 
• Who Bribes? Evidence from the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Program. Yujin Jeong and 
Robert J. Weiner. 
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Market for Control 
• Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from 
Korea. Woochan Kim and Sunwoo Hwang. 
• Market for Corporate Control in Emerging Economy: Disciplining Mechanism or 
Tunnelling Device? Hee Sub Byun, Woojin Kim, Eun Jung Lee, and Kyung Suh Park. 
• The Impact of U.S. Takeovers in Foreign Markets: Their Differential Effects on Emerging 
and Developed Markets. Natasha Burns and Ivonne Liebenberg. 
Shareholder Rights and Corporate Control 
• Shareholder Rights and Tunneling: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment. Jun “QJ” 
Qian and Shan Zhao. 
• Does Granting Minority Shareholders Direct Control over Corporate Decisions Help 
Reduce Value Decreasing Corporate Decisions? Natural Experiment from China. Zhihong 
Chen, Bin Ke, and Zhifeng Yang. 
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